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Abstract
In the expected-utility theory of the monetary value of a statistical life, the so-
called “dead-anyway” effect discovered by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) asserts
that an individuals' willingness to pay (WTP) for small reductions in mortality risk
increases with the initial level of risk. Their reasoning is based on differences in
the marginal utility of wealth between the two states of nature: life and death.
However, this explanation is based on the absence of markets for contingent
claims, i.e. annuities and life insurance. This paper reexamines the “dead-anyway”
effect and establishes two main results: first, for a risk-averse individual without a
bequest motive, marginal WTP for survival does increase with the level of risk but
when insurance markets are perfect, this occurs for a different reason than given
by Pratt and Zeckhauser. Secondly, when the individual has a bequest motive and
is endowed with a sufficient amount of non-inheritable wealth, the effect of initial
risk on WTP for survival is reversed: the higher initial risk the lower the value of
a statistical life.
JEL Classification: D8, H43, I18.
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1. Introduction
The expected-utility foundation of the (monetary) value of a statistical life is based on the
seminal contributions by Jones-Lee (1976, chapter 5) and Rosen (1988). A key question in
this literature is how this value, i.e. the willingness to pay (WTP) for small increments in the
chance of survival is influenced by the characteristics of the person under consideration, in
particular by his (inheritable or non-inheritable) wealth and the initial value of the mortality
risk. This question is of significant policy relevance because in most practical applications,
marginal WTP of the exposed persons can not be directly observed but must be inferred from
e.g. questionnaire responses of a different population, which is often much less exposed. If
there is a systematic relationship between WTP and the level of exposure, then such an
inference may be unwarranted if the results are not appropriately corrected. 
The current state of knowledge on this question is based on a paper by Pratt and Zeckhauser
(1996) who claim that an individual’s WTP will be monotonically increasing in the initial
level of risk due to a "dead-anyway” effect (henceforth: DAE). This means that if marginal
utility of wealth when dead (or marginal utility of bequest) is lower than marginal utility of
wealth when alive (or marginal utility of consumption), then increasing the mortality risk
reduces the expected marginal utility of wealth and thus increases WTP, which is defined as
the marginal rate of substitution between wealth and the chance of survival. 
However, this explanation may be simplistic because it is based on the complete absence of
contingent-claims markets (i.e. annuities and life insurance) where the individual can trade
wealth across different states of nature and thus equalize marginal utility of wealth. It is a
priori unclear whether this result will hold in a world of perfect contingent-claims markets.
Furthermore, while it seems plausible that WTP increases with the individual’s wealth (see,
e.g., Jones-Lee 1976, p. 99), it is not so clear whether this is true for all kinds of wealth
including non-inheritable like human capital, which is obviously lost upon death.
The present paper is devoted to a thorough theoretical analysis of the determinants of WTP
for small increments in the chance of survival under various circumstances. The main
question to be answered is whether the “dead-anyway effect” is invariably true or holds only
under additional assumptions and whether the intuitive explanation of this effect given by
Pratt and Zeckhauser is correct. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model without a bequest
motive, Section 3 adds bequests, Section 4 deals with the case of imperfect insurance markets,2
Section 5 combines these two extensions and Section 6 summarizes the findings and
compares them to the available empirical evidence:
2. The basic model: perfect insurance markets and no bequest motive 
We consider an individual whose (indirect) utility  () uW  is a positive and strictly increasing
function of her wealth W provided she stays alive, i.e.  0, u >   '0 u > . With zero utility
assigned to the state of death, the expected utility of the individuals is: 
() EU u W =π⋅  , (1)
where π is the probability of survival. Total wealth is composed of non-inheritable wealth H,
which is lost upon death, and inheritable wealth V. Non-inheritable wealth includes human
capital and annuities that already exist at the time the individual reveals her willingness to pay
for a change in survival probability. Assume that there is an insurance market where survivors
are offered fair tontine shares. Individuals then will seek to trade their non-human endowment
V for a contract which pays V plus the endowment of those who die  () 1/ V − ππ  ⋅  , or  / V π
in all (Rosen, 1988). The individual faces the following budget constraint: 
WV H π⋅ = +π⋅ .( 2 )
The marginal willingness to pay dV  for a small increase in survival probability dπ equals
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HW −  is the gradient for the change in expected income from an increase in marginal
survival, providing a lower bound for WTP for survival. The assumption of perfect insurance
markets is crucial for the derivation of (3). It means that insurers will adjust the tontine if the
survival probability changes. Old-age insurance schemes that include a demographic factor
for changes in life expectancy, which is used in Scandinavia and was discussed but not
implemented in Germany, fulfill this requirement. However, whether this is guaranteed on an
individual level is doubtful. 
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It turns out that the DAE asserted by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996), i.e. a negative sign of
/ m ∂∂ π , occurs if and only if  "0 u < , which means that the individual is risk-averse. 
The economic intuition behind this result is quite different from the one given by Pratt and
Zeckhauser, who claim that a smaller probability of survival decreases the expected utility
cost of the funds spent on risk reduction by increasing the chance that the money will be
drawn from the zero-utility state of death. The explanation which fits this perfect-markets
case is that decreasing the survival chance π raises the tontine share in the state of survival,
V/π, and thus with a concave utility function lowers the marginal utility of wealth, which in
turn means that more wealth will be sacrificed for a given increase in the probability of
survival.
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Again, with a concave utility function this expression is positive. Thus, survival is a non-
inferior good (Jones-Lee, 1976) and the economic explanation is the same as above:
increasing inheritable wealth has the same effect on the tontine share as raising the risk of
death. 
We finally differentiate m with respect to non-inheritable wealth H and obtain:
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Notice that risk aversion ( '' 0 u < ) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an increase
in the value of life with non-inheritable wealth. An increase in non-inheritable wealth has two
effects on WTP for survival: first, it raises the part of total wealth that is lost upon death so
that the individual is prepared to give up that part to avoid death. This is reflected in the first
term on the RHS of (6). Secondly, it raises total wealth and thereby, with concave utility,
decreases the marginal utility of wealth.4
This one-period analysis can be extended to a continuous consumption life-cycle model with
actuarially fair annuities. Felder et al. (2000) prove for a permanent change of the mortality
risk in the sense of Johansson (1996) the DAE to hold. 
3. Adding bequests
We extend the model by assuming that individuals care for their heirs. Expected utility is
defined as follows: 
() ( ) () 1 LL DD EU u W u W =π⋅ + −π ⋅  , (7)
where  L u  is utility in the state of survival (L) and  D u  represents the bequest motive, i.e.
utility of the heirs in the state of death (D). The state dependent utilities are both assumed to
be strictly increasing :  ', ' 0 LD uu > .
As common in the pertinent literature (e.g. Jones-Lee, 1976), we assume that at all values of
W individuals prefer survival to death, and that at any level of consumption marginal utility
when alive is higher than marginal utility when dead:
() ()       LD uW uW W >∀  , (8)
'( ) '( )      LD uW uW W >∀  . (9)
An insurance market offers 1/π for any dollar spent on an annuity contract and  () 1/ 1−π  for
any dollar spent on life insurance. This gives rise to the budget constraint: 
() 1 LD WW V H π⋅ + −π ⋅ = +π⋅  . (10)
Maximizing (7) subject to (10) leads to the following FOC for an interior optimum:
'( ) '( ) LL DD uW uW =  . (11)
This solution is a maximum if the indifference curves for expected utility are globally convex.
In the appendix we show that this requires concave utility functions in both states of nature
( "0 ,  "0 DL uu << ). Convex indifference curves together with (9) imply that  0 LD WW −>
in the optimum. Furthermore, by (8) and the monotonicity of the utility function, utility in the
state of survival exceeds utility in the state of death,
() () LL DD uW uW > . (12)5
To derive the marginal rate of substitution between survival and wealth, we totally
differentiate expected utility and set the differential equal to zero. Expressing  () LD WW  using










mV H H W W
du =
−
π= − = +  − −   π
. (13)
Note the similarity between (13) and (3). When bequests are added to the pure consumption
model, the value of a statistical life is driven by the utility difference in monetary terms and
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we obtain for the derivative of m with respect to π at an iso-expected-utility locus in the
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=− − ⋅   ∂π
 , (15)
where  () :" 1 " 0 DL au u =π⋅ + −π ⋅ < . (15) implies that an income effect is only involved
when π changes in the perfect insurance model. In fact, according to (11) the price of the
annuity is not part of the FOC. Hence with constant welfare we do not expect a change in
demand for annuities i.e. the compensating price change is zero.  
A combination of (14) and (15) leads to: 
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 , and since a<0:
() ( ) / bL D sign m sign H W W ∂∂ π = − −    . (16)
With zero non-inheritable wealth (H=0),  LD WW >  guarantees the DAE to hold. If H>0, the
sign of  / b m ∂∂ π  is indeterminate and the DAE may fail. Provided that at the initial
equilibrium () , LD WW  an increase in the chance of survival enlarges the opportunity set, the
individual will want to extend her demand for annuities. We conclude that the DAE does not
necessarily carry over to the bequest model if the individual is endowed with non-inheritable
wealth.
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In the Appendix we show that demand for the annuity increases with initial inheritable wealth

































Thus again, concavity of the utility function is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for
the value of life to increase with the level of non-inheritable wealth. 
4. Imperfect insurance markets
If mortality risk cannot be insured, the budget constraint in the no-bequest model changes to: 
WVH =+ , (20)7
so that the distinction between inheritable and non-inheritable wealth can be dropped and the























The DAE is still present, but this time not caused by the concavity of the utility function.
Marginal utility is not affected by the change in mortality risk as the consumption level in the
state of survival remains constant. This effect comes through the objective function: expected
marginal utility of consumption falls when mortality risk rises. This is the DAE that Pratt and
Zeckhauser had in mind. 
From (21) one sees that in this model the elasticity of the value of life with respect to
mortality () ( ) // / mm ∂∂ π π  is unity and does not depend on the level of the initial risk. The
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Here, we have a similar result to non-inheritable wealth in the perfect market case: risk
aversion is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the WTP for survival to increase with
initial wealth. 
5. Combining a bequest motive with imperfect insurance markets
In the bequest model with non-existent insurance markets, the budget constraints in the two
states are: 
L WV H =+ and   D WV = . (24)












                                                
2 The subscript ni at the marginal WTP refers to the case of no-insurance.8
with  () '' 1 ' LD EU u u =π⋅ + −π ⋅  as the expected marginal utility of wealth. For the
















Interestingly, the RHS of (26) can not be signed because the sign of the numerator is
indeterminate for positive values of non-inheritable wealth. The intuition for the case of a
positive sign of  , / ni b m ∂∂ π  is the following: If 
'( ) '( ) LD uVH uV +<  , (27)
the marginal utility of wealth upon death exceeds the one upon survival because non-
inheritable wealth is lost and inheritable wealth can not be shifted to the state of death due to
the absence of a life insurance market. An increase in the risk of death, therefore raises the
expected marginal utility of wealth and thus decreases marginal WTP for survival – the
opposite of the DAE. The elasticity of WTP for survival with respect to the risk is greater than
–1 and decreases with the initial risk – hence it is smaller than in the no bequest model. 
Surprises may also arise with respect to the wealth elasticity of the value of a statistical life.
The derivative of (25) with respect to inheritable wealth gives:
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If (27) holds, risk aversion is not a sufficient condition for the RHS of (28) to be positive.
With sufficiently large non-inheritable wealth, the value of life will decrease with a rise in
















As life insurance policies can not be written, the heirs do not benefit from a change in non-
inheritable wealth. Hence, marginal WTP for survival exclusively depends on the utility
function in the state of survival, except for the utility difference between the two states of
nature. Again, concavity of  L u  is a sufficient condition for WTP to increase with non-
inheritable wealth.9
6. Conclusion
In this study, we have reexamined the claim made by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) of a “dead-
anyway” effect on the value of a statistical life, stating that marginal WTP for survival
increases with the level of initial mortality risk. We have analyzed this hypothesis in models
with and without bequests and under perfect and imperfect insurance markets. The insights
which emerge from the theoretical analysis are as follows:
First, for individuals without a bequest motive the value of a statistical life always increases
with the level of risk exposure if and only if they are risk-averse with respect to wealth.
However, with perfect contingent-claims markets, the label “dead-anyway effect” does not
corresponds with our theoretical result; since in this case the driving force is not the reduced
marginal utility of wealth in the state of death, but the increase in the size of the annuity. 
Secondly, when a bequest motive exists, a reversal of the effect of risk level on WTP for
survival may occur – again, independent of the existence of perfect insurance markets. A
sufficient condition for this to happen is that a significant portion of total wealth is held as
non-inheritable wealth, which of course is lost when the individual dies. Consequently, the
necessary correction of survey results for differences in the level of risk exposure may have
the opposite direction compared to Pratt and Zeckhauser.
Thirdly, WTP for survival depends on the individual’s inheritable and non-inheritable wealth
in different ways: whereas for inheritable wealth risk aversion is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a positive sign, for non-inheritable wealth concavity of the utility functions is
sufficient but not necessary. We would like to mention that all results regarding the effects of
non-inheritable wealth remain valid if labor supply is endogenous. This is an immediate
implication of the envelope theorem.
The theoretical examination performed in this paper can help to explain why the empirical
evidence on the relation between WTP and the level of risk exposure is so inconclusive.
3 For
instance, Smith and Desvousges (1987) found in their questionnaire study that "in the majority
of cases … the bids are larger at smaller baseline risks" (ibid., p. 99). Similarly, Breyer and
Grabka (2001) analyzing data from a large panel study, find no significant effect of risk
measures such as age and recent hospitalizations on the marginal utility of wealth, thus
indirectly casting doubt on the presence of a “dead-anyway” effect.
                                                
3 For extensive reviews of the empirical literature, see Viscusi (1993) and more recently, Hammitt and Graham
(1999).10
A “reverse dead-anyway” effect may be an explanation for the fact that markets for private
annuities are more or less inexistent in the industrialized world. It is well known that private
markets for annuities are crowded out by extensive pay-as-you-go and funded social old-age
insurance. These schemes, however, increase non-inheritable wealth, providing a further
rationale for the individuals’ reluctance to buy annuities.
Appendix: Properties of the bequest model with perfect insurance markets
1.  Second-order condition for the (constrained) maximum
The second-order condition is satisfied if the indifference curves are convex. For the slope of
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Applied locally at the optimum where the FOC (11) ( ' ' LD uu = ) is fulfilled, this condition
boils down to: 
() "1 "0 DL au u =π⋅ + −π ⋅ <  . (33)
Global convexity, however, requires that (32) is fulfilled for all values of  ' L u  and  ' D u  and
therefore risk aversion in both utility functions ( "0 ,  "0 DL uu << ).
2.  Equation (15):  / L W ∂∂ π
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 , which corresponds to (15) in the text.
3.  Equation (18):  / L WV ∂∂  
Again from (10) we have:
() 11 LD WW
VV
∂∂
π⋅ + −π ⋅ =
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 . (36)







(18) then immediately follows from (17). 12
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